regulation
EU Cloud Sovereignty: CADA Assurance Levels, EUCS, SecNumCloud and Where to Host Customer Data
By Art Kukharenko · Published · Updated
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Browse regulation resourcesThe EU cloud sovereignty framework is the set of four Union assurance levels proposed in the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA, COM(2026) 502, 3 June 2026), alongside a separate scoring framework the Commission uses in its own cloud procurement. CADA is a proposal, not law, and it binds mainly public-sector buyers. For anyone choosing where to host a customer data platform (CDP), it shows which controls Europe will treat as sovereign.
Who this is for: security, privacy, procurement and architecture leads in regulated organisations. Part of the regulation hub. Status below is as of mid-October 2026.
Two things are called the "EU cloud sovereignty framework"
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| CADA Union assurance levels | Commission Cloud Sovereignty Framework | |
|---|---|---|
| What it is | Chapter in a legislative proposal (Title IV, Articles 16 to 31, Annexes II and III) 12 | Evaluation document, version 1.2.1, October 2025, from the Commission's digital services directorate 3 |
| Scale | Union assurance levels 1 to 4 | SEAL-0 to SEAL-4 per objective, plus a weighted Sovereignty Score |
| How used | Recognition of cloud services by national authorities; public procurement rules | A minimum SEAL per objective is set in the tender; the score feeds the quality award criterion |
| Status | Proposal, in Parliament committees | Used in a Commission cloud procurement procedure |
SEAL and the score. The Commission document defines eight Sovereignty Objectives (SOV-1 strategic, SOV-2 legal and jurisdictional, SOV-3 data and AI, SOV-4 operational, SOV-5 supply chain, SOV-6 technology, SOV-7 security and compliance, SOV-8 environmental sustainability). SEAL-0 means no sovereignty; SEAL-1 jurisdictional, SEAL-2 data sovereignty, SEAL-3 digital resilience, SEAL-4 full digital sovereignty with no critical non-EU dependencies. Tenders below the required minimum on any objective are rejected. The Sovereignty Score weights the objectives at 15%, 10%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 15%, 10% and 5% respectively, so supply chain counts most 3.
CADA's four assurance levels
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| Level | How verified | Core criteria in Annex II 2 | Third-country control |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Provider self-assessment and EU statement of conformity (Art. 19); SME statements recognised automatically | EU establishment; infrastructure and assets in the EU; customer data including metadata and telemetry stays in the EU; safeguards for any non-EU support; state-of-the-art cybersecurity; transparency about subcontractors | Allowed, but no third-country law forcing early vulnerability reporting |
| 2 | Independent audit (Art. 20); national authority recognition (Art. 17) | Adds EU-located personnel; support initiated and performed in the EU; European cybersecurity certificate at "substantial" (national schemes until one exists); service data not used to train third-country AI; software bill of materials; separation from non-EU subsidiaries | Allowed only if safeguards prevent access, disruption and compelled sanctions compliance |
| 3 | Independent audit | Adds EU-citizen personnel; support by EU residents and by parties not under third-country control; usable for EU classified information (recital 62) | Not allowed, except countries named under Art. 18 |
| 4 | Independent audit | Adds certificate at "high"; sensitive data exclusively in the EU; no third-country effective control over software design and maintenance | Not allowed |
Annex II cites Article 19 for the level 3 derogation, but the third-country provisions are in Article 18; this looks like a drafting slip. Article 18 would let the Commission name third countries that have an adequacy decision, no conflicting access powers, no compelled disruption or sanctions measures, an open market and reciprocal procurement access. Recognition runs through the national authority of establishment: 60 days to assess, then a 60-day review by other Member States, with the Commission deciding disputes (Art. 17). The Commission keeps a central repository (Art. 22) and must review the annexes at least every 18 months (Art. 16).
Who must use which level
- Public bodies and EU institutions. Level 1 is the minimum (Art. 30(2)). Activities identified by a risk assessment as contributing to public order, in NIS2 Annex I and II sectors and in national security, internal security, border management, defence, justice and law enforcement, may only use levels 2, 3 or 4 (Art. 30(3)); the methodology must specify the highest level for the most critical activities, including defence (Art. 29(3)). Derogations exist where no recognised service is available or costs would be disproportionate (Art. 30(4)). Migration after a risk assessment may take up to 12 months (Art. 29(6)).
- Private sector. Entities in NIS2 Annex I sectors may run similar impact assessments (Art. 31(1)); the Commission may require them by delegated act in high-criticality sectors (Art. 31(3)). The Commission expects public procurement to set a market signal that regulated private buyers will mirror (recital 66) 2.
Legislative status
The proposal carries procedure number 2026/0138(COD). In the European Parliament the Industry, Research and Energy committee (ITRE) leads, with the Internal Market committee (IMCO) as joint committee; JURI and LIBE give opinions, and the budgets committee declined one. Rapporteurs were appointed between June and September 2026, and the Legislative Observatory shows referral announced on 17 September 2026 and the stage as awaiting committee decision. It records no Council events yet 4. If adopted, CADA enters into force on the twentieth day after publication and applies one year later; the first risk assessments fall due a year after entry into force 2. No date can be given, and amendments to the level definitions are plausible.
EUCS: why certification did not settle sovereignty
National schemes: SecNumCloud, C5 and ENS
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| Scheme | Issuer | What it is | Sovereignty content |
|---|
| C5 | Germany, BSI | Cloud security criteria catalogue; auditors report against it. BSI says it was completely revised in 2025/26 and lists C5:2026 beside C5:2020 5 | BSI's page mentions no data-location or sovereignty criteria |
These are security or public-sector schemes; only SecNumCloud is widely described as carrying a sovereignty element.
Hyperscaler "sovereign" offers and the CLOUD Act debate
Whether any of these meets level 3 or 4 is untested because the framework is not law. The Commission's view in the proposal (recital 48) is that tailored sovereignty versions of existing offers do not, by themselves, address the extraterritorial reach of third-country laws or possible service disruption 2. The CLOUD Act requires US providers to disclose data in their possession, custody or control regardless of where it is located 10. GDPR Article 48 says third-country orders to disclose personal data are recognised only if based on an international agreement 11, and Data Act Article 32 obliges data processing providers to take adequate measures against unlawful foreign access to non-personal data 12 (see EU Data Act and cloud switching). The EU-US Data Privacy Framework still stands but is under appeal; see GDPR transfers after Latombe. Demand is following: Gartner forecasts sovereign cloud IaaS spending of US$80B in 2026, up 35.6%, with Europe up 83% 13, while the Commission says EU providers' market share fell from 29% in 2017 to 15% in 2022 2.
Sovereign cloud vs private cloud
A private cloud is about exclusivity and operation: infrastructure dedicated to one customer, run by you or a provider. A sovereign cloud is about jurisdiction and control: which law reaches the service, who staffs it and who can compel access. A private cloud in a US provider's EU region can be private without being sovereign; a customer-operated EU data centre is both. The IDC analysts note that vendors can label offers sovereign but customers decide what it requires 14. See residency vs sovereignty.
What it means for where you host a customer data platform
CADA does not bind a private company's CDP choice today. Use its logic as a risk lens:
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| Data and sector | Reasonable hosting options | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Pseudonymous web analytics, low-risk marketing data | EU region of a mainstream cloud or SaaS with EU hosting | Residency and a DPA usually suffice; know support access |
| Consented personal data, non-regulated private sector | EU-resident SaaS or a customer-run VPC in an EU region with customer-held keys | Level 1 style baseline: EU establishment, EU data including telemetry |
| Special-category or health data | Customer-operated private cloud or on-premise in the EU; EU-controlled provider | Sector rules and breach impact; see residency by country |
| Banks, insurers, payments (DORA) | Customer-operated deployment for core customer data; exit plan and register for any SaaS | Exit and concentration duties; see DORA and your marketing stack |
| Public bodies, NIS2 essential entities | Follow the national risk assessment; plan for level 2 or higher for public-order activities | Procurement binding if CADA passes; see NIS2 checklist |
| Defence, justice, law enforcement, classified | Sovereign or air-gapped, customer-operated; level 3 or 4 | Highest assurance and EU-citizen staffing; see citizen engagement data |
PrivyCDP is one of the options for the customer-operated rows, in the customer's own VPC, on-premise, hybrid or sovereign and air-gapped environment 15; the complete guide to self-hosted platforms lists the alternatives.
Sovereign hosting checklist for a customer data platform
- Classify data by sensitivity and by the regimes that apply (GDPR, DORA, NIS2, sector rules).
- Decide whether you are, or sell to, a public body that CADA's procurement rules will reach.
- Identify the provider's legal entity, ultimate owner and any third-country control.
- Confirm where customer data, metadata, logs and telemetry are stored and processed.
- Confirm who can reach the environment for support, from where, and under which approvals.
- Hold the encryption keys yourself, or in an EU-controlled key service.
- Check certifications against your scheme of choice (SecNumCloud, C5, ENS, ISO 27001).
- Write exit and switching terms, including the Data Act dates (see the deadline tracker).
- Re-assess when CADA, EUCS or a national scheme changes.
Frequently asked questions
What is the EU cloud sovereignty framework?
It means two things: CADA's four proposed Union assurance levels, and the Commission's Cloud Sovereignty Framework with SEAL levels and a weighted Sovereignty Score used in its own cloud tenders. Only the second is in operation today.
What are the CADA assurance levels?
Level 1 is a provider self-assessment of EU establishment, EU-located data and infrastructure, and safeguards. Levels 2 to 4 are independently audited and add EU-based support and personnel, restrictions on third-country control and, at level 4, a high-assurance certificate.
Is the Cloud and AI Development Act law?
No. It is Commission proposal COM(2026) 502 of 3 June 2026, procedure 2026/0138(COD), awaiting committee decisions in Parliament as of mid-October 2026. If adopted, it applies one year after entry into force.
Does CADA apply to private companies?
Not directly. Its procurement rules bind public bodies and EU institutions. NIS2 Annex I entities may run impact assessments, and the Commission can require them in high-criticality sectors by delegated act.
What happened to EUCS?
It has not been adopted. Sovereignty requirements were dropped in the March 2024 draft, and the Commission now treats cybersecurity certification and sovereignty as separate questions, with work on EUCS to resume.
Is the AWS European Sovereign Cloud sovereign under CADA?
Unknown. No offer has been assessed because the framework is not law. Levels 3 and 4 restrict third-country control, so ownership and control would be tested in audit.
What is the difference between a sovereign cloud and a private cloud?
Private concerns dedicated infrastructure and who operates it. Sovereign concerns jurisdiction, control and who can compel access. A private cloud can be foreign-controlled; a sovereign one limits that.
Sources
- European Commission, Proposal for a Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA), library page, 3 June 2026 (updated 8 June 2026) - Open source
- COM(2026) 502 final, proposal text (Articles 16 to 31, 48, recitals, explanatory memorandum) - ; Annexes I to III - Open source · Additional source
- European Commission, Directorate-General for Digital Services, Cloud Sovereignty Framework v1.2.1, October 2025 - Open source
- European Parliament Legislative Observatory, procedure 2026/0138(COD) - Open source
- BSI, Cloud Computing Compliance Criteria Catalogue (C5) - Open source
- Real Decreto 311/2022 (Esquema Nacional de Seguridad), BOE-A-2022-7191 - Open source
- Amazon, AWS launches the AWS European Sovereign Cloud, 15 January 2026 - ; AWS European Sovereign Cloud - Open source · Additional source
- Microsoft, Sovereign Cloud (vendor marketing page) - Open source
- Microsoft Learn, What is the EU Data Boundary? - Open source
- 18 U.S.C. 2713 (CLOUD Act), Cornell LII - Open source
- GDPR Article 48 (text) - Open source
- Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 (Data Act), Article 32 - Open source
- Gartner press release, 9 February 2026 - Open source
- IDC, European AI Stack: Will AI Live in the Public Cloud Alone?, 15 October 2026 - Open source
- PrivyCDP deployment options - Open source
Put this evaluation into practice.
Assess your deployment requirementsThis article is general information, not legal advice.
Further reading
- Customer data regulation guides
- Deployment readiness checklist
- Self-hosted and on-prem CDPs
- Data Sovereignty vs Data Residency
- Government Citizen Engagement Platform
Published: · Updated:
Publication date recorded for the approved release. Editorial updates do not establish legal approval or a customer result.